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 BACKGROUND: In today’s world of increased awareness regarding the concepts of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate governance (CG), many firms in 
the developed countries consider noncompliance with CSR and CG standards as an 
important source of risk to their reputations with stakeholders. OBJECTIVE: The aim 
of this study is to investigate the relationship between the corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (CSRD) index and corporate factors, namely, board size, board 
independence, board meetings, CEO duality, a firm’s size, leverage, profitability and 
age. This is the first known study in the case of Saudi Arabia to use the GRI 4th edition 
indicators to construct the CSRD index and evaluate Saudi listed firms. Results: The 
results show that profitability and size factor have positive and significant association 
with CSR disclosure in listed Saudi firms. While CG characteristics have no impact on 
CSR disclosure except board independence which has a negative impact. Conclusion: 
The average of CSRD index among Saudi firms is too low, it is about 11% that means 
Saudi firms disclose 11% of the information that they have to provide for stockholders 
according to GRI guidelines. Furthermore, the study concludes that the most polluted 
sectors “Energy and Petrochemical sectors” in the country disclose more information 
about CSR.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate governance (CG) are high on the agenda for policy 
makers, researchers and business managers in countries across the world. This has greater relevance after 
memorable cases such as Arthur Anderson, Worldcom and Enron in the USA. CG has been brought under 
greater scrutiny following the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Peters et al., 2011).  
Attention has been drawn to CSR since the 1950s, when firms began to claim they had responsibilities to 
society and that their actions could benefit the community. In the 1960s CSR became an ethical obligation for 
firms, and then in 1980 the academia tried to expand the description of CSR concepts. Finally in the 21st 
century, CSR became an integral part of strategic company plans, and it has become a central reference of 
regulatory bodies and governments (Moura-Leite and Padgett, 2011). 
Bhambu (2015) defines CSR as social activities that are required by law. CSR is an embodiment of the 
voluntary practice of sustainable CG, but not arbitrary in a company's main business and it is embedded in its 
business strategic plan. CSR can be practiced interchangeably with other patterns containing responsible 
competitiveness, corporate citizenship, or triple bottom-line, among others. It has been integrated into business 
strategies for years, but has progressively been involved in the profit making process. It goes beyond social 
goals and it has become a requirement in economic, social and environmental dimensions, and at the level of 
stakeholder relations (O'Riordan and Fairbrass, 2008). 
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The CG concept is defined as the structures and processes for making a company directed and controlled. 
The main goal of CG is to make certain the flow of external investments to firms. The viewpoint of finance 
providers can be formulated as follows, “CG deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investments.” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The tasks of CG 
include the relationships among the management, Board of Directors, controlling shareholders, minority 
shareholders rights and other stakeholders. The important benefit of good CG is that it provides the 
sustainability of economic development by providing a robust corporate performance and increasing the flow of 
capital from the outside (The World Bank, 2009). 
A clear interrelationship exists between CSR and CG; therefore CSR can be elucidated as a firm’s ability to 
influence the ecological, social and economic development in a positive manner through its governance 
practices and market presence (Krechovská and Procházková, 2014). CG, CSR and corporate ethical concepts 
have some common features and all these three concepts are interrelated. CG demands that CEOs provide more 
transparency and accountability, whereas corporate social responsibility involves supporting the surrounding 
community with social activities. Ultimately, business ethics clarify moral values for the employees in order to 
help managers to make their firms more accountable and transparent (Tayşir and Pazarcık, 2013). 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is taken as an example of emerging markets because of a number of 
reasons. First, Saudi Arabia has outstanding traits. The KSA is an Arab emerging country that has strict 
religious rules, which are different from the developed countries in terms of social and political aspects and 
traditions. And these socio-cultural factors play a very important role in the society’s philosophy.  For instance, 
Islamic principles affect every aspect of Saudi social life “the daily life, business, law, economics and political” 
(Peters et al., 2011; Habbash et al., 2016; Khan et al., 2013; Alsaif, 2015). However, socio-cultural and Islamic 
principles are highly relevant and supportive of the adoption of a CSR system in KSA (Alsaif, 2015; Khan, 
2013). Moreover, CSR system is in the early stage of development in KSA, CG code was applied in 2007; this 
code is influenced significantly by the Islamic principles (Mandurah et al., 2012; Khan, 2013; Albassam, 2014).  
Second, The KSA is a member of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and one of the biggest economies in the 
world and it is a member of the G20 (Khurshid et al., 2014; Alsaif, 2015). It has a position of leadership in the 
Arab region, it represented 25% of the total Arab GDP and 44% of total Arab market capitalization in 2010 
(Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Albassam, 2014). Further, Saudi Arabia is a petroleum-based economy which 
possesses 20 % of the world’s proven reserve. It is the largest exporter of oil in the world and is one of the 
largest oil producers in OPEC, with about 31% of the total OPEC production in 2010 (Khan, 2013; Albassam, 
2014).  Third, internationally published material on the KSA in the context of CSR is limited (Khan, 2010; 
Hussainey and Salama, 2010; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Khurshid et al., 2014; Khan, 2013; Habbash et 
al., 2016). 
Numerous studies examine the relationship between the corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) 
and good CG practices in different countries especially in developed nations. CG in KSA is a recent concept, 
and the Saudi authorities only released the Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006 (Albassam, 2014). 
KSA as an emerging market still lacks in-depth research, which can demonstrate the extent to which Saudi firms 
provide disclosure of CSR in their annual reports and the effects of CG characteristics on voluntary disclosure. 
In addition, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no studies exist that aims to evaluate and construct a CSRD 
index of Saudi firms according to Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards and which consider 
environmental and social dimensions as well as covering data from all sectors in the KSA except financial 
institutions which are excluded because of their distinctive features and the different requirements for disclosure 
(Klai and Omri, 2011; Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Alturki, 2014; Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Haß et al., 2014). 
Some research has analyzed the rate of CSRD by companies through their annual reports and seeks to 
decipher a link with CG characteristics, as well as other research which has examined the relationship between 
CSRD and CG attributes, financial data and non-financial. The present study attempts to identify at which rate 
Saudi firms are concerned about CSR reporting for public audience on their annual reports. This is an addition 
to analyzing how CSRD related to CG characteristics, board size, board independence, board meetings, CEO 
duality and other financial factors namely, firm’s size, leverage, profitability, and non-financial data such as the 
age of the firm. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the extent of CSRD and CG characteristics, 
namely board size, board independence; board meetings, CEO duality and other financial factors firm’s size, 
leverage, profitability and non-financial factors such as the age of the firm. The finding of this study would 
provide deeper understanding of the nature and the extent of reporting and disclosure of CSR in a unique region 
such as the KSA and identifying how CG characteristics affect other financial and non-financial factors on CSR 
reporting. As mentioned earlier, CG practices and CSRD are still relevant issues in KSA. It would be the first 
study to investigate these issues in all different sectors in KSA considering CG attributes, financial and non-
financial factors. Therefore it would be a good reference for future researchers. 
The study would cover non-financial and financial data of 109 Saudi firms out of 170 listed companies in 
the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) in all sectors for which data is available for the period from 2012-2014. 
3                                                                        Ayman I. F. Issa, 2017 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 11(10) July 2017, Pages: 1-19 
 
Firms without complete data would be excluded from the study. Therefore the size of the sample depends on the 
availability of data for the firms that are being investigated. The present research paper focuses on CG 
characteristics, board size, board independence; board meetings, CEO duality and other financial factors firm’s 
size, profitability, leverage and non-financial such as the age of firm to assess how they’re associated with 
CSRD. 
 
2. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development: 
2.1 Theoretical Review: 
Numerous theories in the literature seek to provide an explanation of the relationships among corporate 
governance, voluntary disclosure and financial performance. The agency theory is adopted as the main 
theoretical framework and it is supplemented with predictions from managerial signaling, stakeholder, 
stewardship and resource dependence theories (Albassam, 2014, p. 59). 
 
Agency Theory: 
Agency theory is one of the most dominant theories in the context of CG (Albassam, 2014). The agency 
theory has been explained by Jensen and Meckling (1976), they stated that companies are more likely to provide 
more voluntary information to reduce the agency cost that comes from the conflict between the agent’s interests 
and principal’s interests. In other words, agency theory seeks to reduce agency conflicts between shareholders 
and managers by aligning the interests of managers (agents) with those of shareholders (principals). 
Furthermore, the literature shows that solutions to agency problems through the establishment of a set of 
optimal legal contracts between top management and the company’s shareholders (Solomon, 2007: Albassam, 
2014). First, it recommends that increasing the proportion of non-executive directors on the board; which could 
improve the board’s independence. Also, this would help to provide more effective monitoring of the agency 
problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Solomon, 2007). Furthermore, board sub-
committees, such as audit, nomination and remuneration committees, are important governance characteristics 
to monitor and control managerial behavior (Klein, 1998; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Second, the existence of 
an internal control mechanism can help to align the different interests of shareholders and top management 
(Walsh and Seward, 1990; Boyd, 1995). Third, designing a management incentive plan that is associated with 
financial performance can encourage managers to improve their performance (Murphy, 1985; Mehran, 1995; 
Chalevas, 2011). This, in turn, may limit wealth expropriation by a firm’s top management (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
In sum, Agency theory suggests that good practices of CG make companies more accountable to 
shareholders and other stakeholders and it helps to mitigate managerial opportunism thus reducing the agency 
costs (Core et al., 1999; Solomon, 2010). Furthermore, it should mitigate monitoring and bonding costs, thereby 
leading to overall improvement in the governance system, voluntary disclosure and firm’s performance (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Doukas et al., 2000; Albassam, 2014).  
 
Managerial signalling Theory: 
The managerial signalling theory argues that insiders have more precise information than those who are 
outside and that gives them an advantage to predict the future (Spence, 1973). To reduce information 
asymmetries between the insiders and outsiders, companies are expected to adopt a good CG system (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Also, greater voluntary disclosure by companies lowers the amount of private information and 
offer equal opportunities to shareholders in accessing information, which can help in reducing agency problems 
and the cost of equity capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Brown et al., 2004). Furthermore, greater 
voluntary disclosure reduces the information problem between companies and investors, hence this may help to 
make better investment opportunities (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
 
Stakeholder Theory: 
Stakeholder theory represents a wider perspective of CG (Albassam, 2014; Bendickson et al., 2016). It 
postulates that firms should put the stakeholders’ needs as their first priorities as they should be managed in the 
interests and benefits of stakeholder groups rather than stockholders’ interest to maximize wealth (Freeman and 
Evan, 1990). Successful firms protect the interest of different stakeholder groups such as, shareholders, creditors, 
managers, employees, suppliers, customers, communities and the general public (Hill and Jones, 1992; Clarkson, 
1995; Mitchell et al., 1997). 
There are three assumptions underlying stakeholder theory. First, Corporations should be operated not only 
for the financial benefit of their shareowners, but also for satisfying all stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997; 
Freeman and Phillips, 2002). Second, managers are equally accountable to all stakeholders, not only the firm’s 
shareholders, but also other corporate stakeholders, such as employees, government, local communities, 
customers and suppliers (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Third, stakeholder theory is based on organizational 
ethics and strongly connected to corporate social responsibility (Phillips, 2003).  
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Stewardship Theory: 
Stewardship theory argues a view of managerial motivation alternative to agency theory. The executives, 
under this theory, far from being an opportunistic shirker, essentially want to do a good job, to act as responsible 
stewards of the corporate assets (Donaldson and Davis, 1994). Stewardship theory assumes there is no agency 
cost because of the mutual trust between managers and shareowners, it proposes that executive managers are 
naturally trustworthy and should be fully empowered (Donaldson and Davis, 1994; Letza et al., 2004; Nicholson 
and Kiel, 2007). According to Albassam (2014), Stewardship theory has been established based on a number of 
assumptions, as follows. First, Aligning the directors and management interests with the Shareholders interests 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1994). Second, as long as managers are trustees of the company, CEO duality leads to 
high returns to shareholders (Donaldson and Davis, 1994). Finally, executive managers seek to employ the firms’ 
resources in the best possible way to maximize corporate performance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).  
 
Resource Dependence Theory: 
Resource dependence theory proposes that provision of resources is an important function of the firm’s 
directors. This function refers directly to the ability of the board of directors to provide resources to the firm 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The board of directors not only performs monitoring and 
controlling role, but also provides necessary critical resources to the firm’s success, counsel and advice, 
legitimacy, communicating information between external organizations and the firm, and preferential access to 
commitments or support from important elements outside the firm (Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman and Dalzel, 2003). 
 
2.2 Empirical Studies:  
The literature review has tremendous studies that focus on CSRD in the West and other developed countries 
but there is a dearth of academic research into CSRD in emerging markets such as KSA (Khan, 2010; Hussainey 
and Salama, 2010; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Khan, 2013; Khurshid et al., 2014; Uyar et al., 2013; 
Kansal et al., 2014; Alsaif, 2015). 
Peters et al. (2011) point out an important finding about taxonomy of systems of corporate governance. 
They said that good practices of CG or good CSR system can boost investor’s confidence, provide easier access 
to finance, lower the cost of capital for emerging market firms, increase a firm’s value and enhance operational 
performance. However, following a good CG practice in emerging markets may not be enough to ensure that 
larger goals such as business growth, eliminating corruption or smooth development are met. They continued 
that: 
“One set of standards which seem relatively effective in mature markets may not work at all in emerging 
markets, but that alternative CGsystems which reflect the institutional realities of these emerging economy 
settings will nonetheless be needed.”   
To begin with the Saudi context, I found only six related studies; five of them investigate the drivers of 
voluntary disclosure, while the other one investigates the extent of voluntary disclosure. Habbash et al. (2013) 
examine the drivers of voluntary disclosure in KSA. They used a sample of 361 observations for the firms listed 
on the Saudi Stock Exchange over the period 2007-2011. They found that the extension of voluntary disclosure 
on average is 18.38%, and it’s considered as the poorest score recoded when compared with the other rates in 
the Arab region. They found that there’s a positive significant relationship between firm size, firm age, firm 
profitability and the voluntary disclosure extent. And there is a negative significant association was found 
between firm leverage and voluntary disclosure, while no significant relationship was found with board 
independence. Alsaeed (2006) assesses the influence of specific characteristics and the impact on the voluntary 
disclosure using a sample of 40 non-financial firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange Market (Tadawul) 
during the period 2002-2003. The results indicate that firm size has a strong positive correlation with the level of 
the voluntary disclosure; however, debt, ownership dispersion, listing age, profit margin, return on equity, 
liquidity, audit type, and industry type have no significant influence on the levels of voluntary disclosure. 
Alturki (2014) investigates the relationship between voluntary disclosure and specific factors in 116 non-
financial public companies that listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). He found that the voluntary 
disclosure level in KSA 0.29 percent also he resulted that firm’s size, profitability, and listing age have strong 
positive association with the extent of voluntary disclosure while leverage has insignificant impact. Basuony et 
al. (2014) examine the drivers of voluntary internet financial disclosures in 266 firms listed on the stock 
exchanges of KSA and Oman. They concluded that firm’s size is the main factor impacts on voluntary internet 
disclosure; large firms have a tendency to disclose more financial information in order to reduce information 
asymmetry and decrease agency costs.   
Mariq (2009) investigates the quality and extent of voluntary disclosure in 52 Saudi firms through their 
annual reports in the year 2005. A disclosure index consisting of 60 items was constructed to assess the content 
of reporting voluntary information. The author concluded that there is a large variance in the extent and nature 
of voluntary information between Saudi firms. Also, it found that the larger firms are inclined to disclose more 
voluntary disclosure to stakeholders.  
5                                                                        Ayman I. F. Issa, 2017 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 11(10) July 2017, Pages: 1-19 
 
While these five studies in KSA assess the association between certain firm characteristics such as firm size, 
profitability, leverage, firm age, debt, ownership structure, liquidity, auditing type, industry classification and 
voluntary disclosure level, one study has investigated the association between CG attributes with voluntary 
disclosure level. Al-Janadi et al. (2013) examine the influence of internal and external CG mechanisms on 
voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia. They used a sample of 87 firms for 2006-2007 and implemented content 
analysis to rate CSRD. They concluded that non-executive directors, board size, CEO duality have a significant 
positive correlation with voluntary disclosure quality and extent. 
With regard to other emerging countries, there are many studies have been done in CG attributes and how 
corporate characteristics associated with voluntary disclosure and the determinants of CSRD. In Malaysia, Said 
et al. (2009) examine the relationship between CG characteristics, namely the board size, board independence, 
duality, audit committee, ten largest shareholders, managerial ownership, foreign ownership and government 
ownership and the extent of CSRD. They found that just government ownership and audit committee associated 
with the extent CSRD. In Egypt, Samaha et al. (2015) found that board size, board composition and audit 
committee have a significant positive effect on voluntary disclosure, whereas CEO duality has a significant 
negative impact. In Kenya, Barako (2007) investigates the extent to which CG attributes, ownership structure 
and company characteristics affect voluntary disclosure of various types of information. He found that voluntary 
disclosure is influenced by CG attributes, ownership structure and corporate characteristics. 
Kolsi (2012) finds that the significant drivers of voluntary disclosure in Tunisian firms are leverage, audit 
quality, financial sector and profitability ratio while ownership structure and firm size have no effect on 
voluntary disclosure. However a study has done in the UAE indicates that profitability and size are not 
significant, Aljifri (2008) examines annual reports of 31 listed firms in the UAE for the fiscal year 2003. He 
found that the size, the profitability, and the debt-equity ratio have insignificant association with the level of 
disclosure. 
Saleh et al. (2008) investigate a sample of the 200 largest firms listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia 
and collected data from 2000 to 2005. They found that there is a significant positive association between CSR 
and financial performance of Malaysian firms. They suggest that engaging in social activities for local firms can 
achieve advanced levels of financial performance.  
Hussainey et al. (2011) examine a sample of 111 Egyptian listed companies for the period of 2005–2010 by 
employing the content analysis technique. They used five themes of CRS to represent five dependent variables 
namely, the environment, human resources, community involvement, energy and customer and product. They 
concluded that profitability is the key driver of CSR for Egyptian listed companies and audit type has a negative 
impact. Also, they found that ownership structure, company size, gearing and liquidity do not drive CSR 
reporting decision in Egypt. 
Uyar et al. (2013) investigate the factors that impact the level of voluntary information disclosure in 
Turkish manufacturing companies listed in the Borsa Istanbul for 2010. They found that firm’s size and 
independent directors’ factor have a positive association with voluntary disclosure, while leverage has a 
negative association. Profitability, firm’s age and board size do not have a significant influence on voluntary 
disclosure. 
Kansal et al. (2014) examine the relationship between specific financial and non-financial factors and the 
level of CSRD based on an extensive sample of top 100 Indian companies in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
500 index. They found that industry type, profitability and corporate reputation are the main drivers of CSRD 
however, business risk has no impact on CSRD.   
 
Board Independence:  
The agency problem emerged from the conflict between the agent’s interests and principal’s interests where 
the agent has the tendency to maximize his interests at the expense of principal’s welfare (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Therefore, increasing the proportion of non-executive directors on the board; which could improve the 
board’s independence. Also, this would help to provide more effective monitoring of the agency problem 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Solomon, 2010). According to Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006), they pointed out that there is a significant positive association between the proportion of independent 
directors on the firm’s board and voluntary disclosure. The same results were found by several prior studies, for 
example, (Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Khan, 2010; Al-Janadi et al., 2013). Other 
studies (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Barako et al., 2006; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012) 
found that board independence factor is associated negatively with the extent of voluntary disclosure. While 
(Aljifri et al., 2014; Giannarakis, 2014; Alhazaimeh et al., 2014) did not find a significant impact. 
In the Saudi context, previous research on the association between board independence and voluntary 
disclosure offers mixed results. Al-Janadi et al. (2013) find a positive correlation between board independence 
and voluntary disclosure. But, Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) find a negative relationship. In the present 
paper, we predict that there is a significant positive association between the proportion of independent directors 
on the board of Saudi firms and the level of CSR disclosure. Thus, the following is hypothesized: 
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H1: There is a positive relationship between board independence and the level of CSRD. 
 
Board Size: 
According to the agency theory, shareholders expect a high level of disclosure from the corporate board of 
directors, as they have been elected to represent their interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory 
proposes that increasing the proportion of non-executive directors on the board; which could help to provide 
more effective monitoring of the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Solomon, 
2010). Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) argue that increased managerial monitoring positively related to the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. Esa and Ghazali (2012) stated that board size is a major driver influencing the extent of 
CSR disclosure. Firms with a larger board size disclose significantly more voluntary information in their reports 
than others (Said et al., 2009; Al-Janadi et al., 2013). While, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Yermack (1996) 
suggest that limiting the size of the board may improve the firm’s efficiency. Beasley (1996), Yermack (1996) 
and Vafeas (1999) argue that increasing the size of the board may lead to poor communication, coordination 
problems among directors. Some studies revealed that there is no significant relationship between board size and 
voluntary disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Sun et al., 2010; Uyar et al., 2013; Giannarakis, 2014).  
In the Saudi corporate context, the relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure mixed results. 
Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) find no significant relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure. 
While Al-Janadi et al. (2013) find a positive relationship. In the present paper, we believe that Saudi firms with 
large boards tend to disclose more information. Therefore, the hypothesis is: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between board size and the level of CSRD. 
 
Board Meetings: 
Academic literature provides empirical evidence of the benefit of number of board meetings on voluntary 
disclosure. Lipton and Lorsch (1992); Laksmana (2008) and Allegrini and Greco (2011) find that the number of 
board meetings is positively associated with greater information disclosure. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that 
an active board of directors is a more effective one because board meetings frequently enable directors to better 
monitor the firm’s performance, and leads them to have a tendency to disclose more voluntary information. 
Webb (2004); Giannarakis (2014) and Alhazaimeh et al. (2014) documented that the number of board meetings 
does not play a vital role to the extent of CSR disclosure.  
In the Saudi context, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no studies exist that examine the relationship 
between the number of board meetings and voluntary disclosure. We test the hypothesis that frequent board 
meetings positively affect the level of information voluntarily disclosed. Thus, the following is hypothesized: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between board meetings and the level of CSRD. 
 
CEO Duality: 
CEO duality is defined as the firm’s CEO also serves as board chairperson (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). 
According to agency theory, duality boosts CEO entrenchment by reducing board monitoring and controlling 
effectiveness (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Finkelstein and D'aveni, 1994). Firms with CEO duality are more likely 
to be associated with a lower level of voluntary disclosure (Gul and Leung 2004). According to empirical 
research, the relation between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure in prior research has been inconclusive 
(Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). Cheng and Courtenay (2006); Said et al. (2009) and Giannarakis (2014) found 
out no association between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure while Gul and Leung (2004) documented a 
negative association between CEO duality and the extent of voluntary information. In the Saudi context, Al-
Janadi et al. (2013) find a negative association between CEO duality and voluntary information disclosure. We 
expect a negative relationship between CEO duality and the level of CSR disclosure. The hypothesis is: 
H4: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and the level of CSRD. 
 
Firm’s Size: 
Tremendous studies indicated that larger firms tend to disclose more voluntary information to the public 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Reverte, 2009; Khan, 2010; Sun et al., 2010; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Al-Janadi et 
al., 2013; Basuony, 2014; Alturki, 2014; Giannarakis, 2014). The rationale behind this conclusion is that large 
firms are more visible and hence receiving more attention from external constituencies such as the government, 
media and professional groups and the general public (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). However, some studies 
found no correlation between firm’s size and voluntary disclosure, for example (Said et al., 2009; Hussainey et 
al., 2011; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). 
In the Saudi context, previous research on the association between firm’s size and voluntary disclosure 
offers a positive relationship. Alsaeed (2006), Mariq (2009), Habbash et al. (2013), Basuony (2014) and Alturki 
(2014) find a positive association between voluntary disclosure and firm’s size. In the present paper, we predict 
that large Saudi firms are more likely to report CSR information in their annual reports because these firms are 
more likely to cover the costs associated with reporting this information. Thus, 
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H5: There is a positive relationship between market capitalization and the level of CSRD. 
 
Leverage: 
In a highly leveraged firm, management needs to legitimize its activities to stakeholders and hence firm’s 
management is more likely to voluntarily disclose more information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005). Another explanation is high systematic risk firms use voluntary disclosure to reduce the risk 
(Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). (Pled and Iatridis, 2012; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Chan et al., 2014) 
documented that there is a significant positive association between leverage and the voluntary disclosure. Others 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Reverte, 2009; Khan, 2010; Hussainey et al., 2011; Alturki, 2014) found no 
significant impact. In the Saudi context, previous research on the association between leverage and voluntary 
disclosure offers mixed results. Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) find a significant positive association between 
leverage and the voluntary disclosure; however, Alturki (2014) finds no relationship. In the present paper, we 
predict that more highly leveraged Saudi firms are more likely to disclose more voluntary information in their 
annual reports because these firms need to legitimize their activities to stakeholders. Thus, the hypothesis is: 
H6: There is a positive relationship between leverage and the level of CSRD. 
 
Profitability: 
Profitable firms disclose more social disclosure to the audience to legitimize their existence (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005). A positive correlation between voluntary disclosure and profitability was hypothesized in prior 
research (see for example, Wang et al., 2008; Khan, 2010; Hussainey et al., 2011; Al-Moataz and Hussainey 
2012; Al-Janadi et al. 2013; Kansal et al., 2014; Giannarakis, 2014 and Alturki, 2014). Some studies did find no 
relationship (see for example, Said et al., 2009; Reverte, 2009; Basuony, 2014; Aljifri et al., 2014; Barac et al., 
2014). Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) justify that the underlying cause of a positive correlation between corporate 
social responsibility disclosure and profitability is management’s knowledge. The managers have the knowledge 
to make their firms profitable also have the knowledge and understanding of social responsibility. This might 
clarify the higher levels of social information disclosure by profitable firms.  
In the Saudi context, previous research on the association between profitability and voluntary disclosure 
offers mixed results. Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012), Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Alturki (2014) find a positive 
association between voluntary disclosure and profitability; however, Said et al. (2009) and Basuony (2014) find 
no relationship. In the present paper, we believe that Saudi profitable firms are more likely to report more CSR 
information in their annual reports than less profitable firms. Therefore, the hypothesis is: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between return on equity and the level of CSRD. 
 
Firm’s Age: 
Some previous studies documented that the age of firm influences the extent of social disclosure and that 
long-established firms are likely to provide more voluntary social disclosures (Roberts, 1992; Cormier et al., 
2005; Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Hossain, (2008); Alturki, 2014). While other studies by Nikolaj et al. (2005), 
Rahman et al. (2011) and Kansal et al. (2014) reported no relationship. In the Saudi context, Alturki (2014) 
finds a positive relationship between firm’s age and voluntary disclosure. Based on this Saudi study, we 
formulate our eighth hypothesis as follows:  
H8: There is a positive relationship between age and the level of CSRD. 
 
Industry Type: 
A number of prior studies have established that industry affiliation is correlated significantly with the extent 
of voluntary disclosure (Cooke, 1992; Roberts, 1992; Suwaidan, 1997; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Al-Janadi et 
al., 2013; Kansal et al., 2014; Aljifri et al., 2014). Wallace et al. (1994) and Dye and Sridhar (1995) suggest that 
disclosure level is more likely to differ among different type of industries, reflecting their unique attributes. 
Owsus-Ansah (1998) argues that some industries are highly regulated due to their overall contribution to a 
country’s export earnings. These industries may be subject to more rigorous control, which may affect the 
disclosure practices of the firms in this industry. A disclosure differential may also be related to the type of 
product line or the diversity of products of the firms in an economy (Owsus-Ansah, 1998).  
In the Saudi context, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) find that a positive relationship between industry type and 
voluntary disclosure. Therefore, a positive association can be assumed between the industry type and the level 
of CSR disclosure. Therefore, the hypothesis is: 
H9: There is a positive relationship between industry type and the level of CSRD. 
 
2.3 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI): 
Several global initiatives on sustainability reporting guidelines and the GRI considered as the best respected 
and most prevalent non-financial reporting framework also play a significant role in raising the practical level 
among different international organizations (Brown et al., 2007; Etzion and Ferraro, 2010; Ramos et al., 2013; 
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Barkemeyer et al., 2015). The GRI provides guidance for organizations to convey effective sustainability reports 
that contain valuable information that matters to their business and their key stakeholders (GRI, 2013). The GRI 
guidelines specify two sets of principles a. the principles for defining the content and describing what firm 
should cover in the content of a sustainability report, they are four principles “stakeholder inclusiveness, 
sustainability context, materiality and completeness” and b. the principles for describing and ensuring the 
quality of report in order to achieve transparency that include aspects such as, balance, comparability, accuracy, 
timeliness, clarity and reliable content (GRI, 2013). 
The guidelines prescribe two types of standard reporting: general standard disclosures and specific standard 
disclosures. General standard disclosures state seven sections namely strategy and analysis, organizational 
profile, identified material aspects and boundaries, stakeholder engagement, report profile, governance and 
ethics and integrity. And specific standard disclosures organized into three dimensions: economic, ecological 
and social. Furthermore, the social dimension includes four sub-categories, which are labor practices and decent 
work, human rights, society and product responsibility (GRI, 2013). In the present study, content analysis is 
constructed according to the GRI  4 version (2013). Number of prior studies used GRI to evaluate sustainability 
reporting as example see, (Stiller and Daub, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2007; Gill et al., 2008; Font et al., 2012; 
Toppinen et al., 2012). 
 
3. Methodology: 
3.1 Data: 
To calculate CSRD index and collecting required information to measure independent variables, the study 
focuses on the annual reports of a sample of 109 Saudi listed firms which covers 13 sectors for three years 
(2012-2014) as shown in table 3.1. Financial institutions “banking and insurance sectors” are excluded because 
of their distinctive features and the different requirements of disclosure (Klai and Omri, 2011; Esa and Ghazali, 
2012; Alturki 2014; Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Haß et al., 2014). The sample of the present study consists of 109 
out of 170 firms which are listed on Saudi Stock Exchange Market (Tadawul). This sample constitutes 64 
percent of the total listed firms in Saudi market in the period of 2012-2014, thus the data is considered as panel 
data. According to Albassam (2014), using panel data has several advantages; first, including both cross-
sectional and time-series data; second, improving the freedom degrees; third, reduction of multicollinearity 
problems, finally, minimizing the potential endogeneity problems.Annual reports are collected from companies’ 
profiles which are available at www.tadawual.com.sa for the period from 2012 until 2014, and there are few 
companies which published their sustainable reports on the GRI website: www.database.globalreporting.org.   
Annual reports establish the main data for this study because of several reasons (Hussainey, 2004). First, 
the corporate annual report is the most widespread and it is considered as statutory document and it is produced 
regularly by the firms (Khan, 2010; Echave and Bhati, 2010; Hussainey et al., 2011). Second, most firms issue 
their annual reports within three to four months after the financial year-end, thus timing differences are reduced 
(Hussainey, 2004; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). Third, the selection of annual reports is consistent with other 
previous relevant studies (Hussainey, 2004; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Khan, 2010). Fourth, often annual 
reports are used by financial analysts to assess, analysis and making investment decisions (Christopher et al., 
1997). Also, they are more accessible and comparable than other resources (Hussainey et al., 2011).  Finally, the 
annual report is used alone in this study because it provides availability and ability to calculate and scoring 
CSRD (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). 
 
3.2 CSRD Index: 
The method of content analysis is performed to assess the extent of CSRD in Saudi firms and to codify the 
text and content of annual reports. Content analysis employed in previous studies to collect voluntary disclosure 
data from annual reports and examine the level of disclosure (see, for example, Khan, 2010; Karagiorgos, 2010; 
Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Kansal et al., 2014). Table 3.1 illustrates the construction of CSRD index based on 
certain items that were compiled according to GRI fourth version framework. 
GRI (G4) guidelines comprised of three categories that are economic, environmental and social perspective. 
The present study considers social and environmental categories to code the CSRD index, since firms are 
obliged to disclose their financial information (Gamerschlag et al., 2011). CSRD index was evaluated using 42 
aspects from social and environmental categories. The social category consists of four sub-categories which are 
labor practices and decent work, human rights, society, product responsibility. In the present study, Content 
analysis is used to construct the CSRD index by quantifying the amount of CSR information provided by firms 
in the annual reports.  
Content analysis is a technique of codifying the content or text of a piece of writing into groups based on 
selected criteria (Weber, 1988; Guthrie and Abeysekera, 2006). It is the systematic, quantitative, objective 
analysis of the written content (Neuendorf, 2002). Content analysis has been used widely in literature to 
measure voluntary disclosure, for example (Khan, 2010; Karagiorgos, 2010; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Uyar et 
al., 2013; Albassam, 2014).  
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Following to the prior studies of (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Fiori et al., 2009; Karagiorgos, 2010; 
Gamerschlag et al., 2011), this study uses a scale score from 0 to 3 to rate the indicators. When a firm does not 
disclose the specific indicator, it is graded with 0. A firm is rated 1 or 2 depending on the extent of the 
description (e.g. 1 if the firm only names the aspect and 2 if there is a very poor description (e.g. if the firm only 
names the aspect without any or with an unclear description). The firm rated with 3 score if it has a satisfying 
description. The calculation of CSRD index computed by dividing the actual score given to a firm to the 
maximum disclosure which is 126. For example, if a firm in a certain year rated by 50 score, then its actual 
score is 50, and the CSRD index= 50/126, which is 0.396. 
 
3.3 The Model: 
Ordinary Least Square regression is performed in this study. CSRD index is the dependent variable and 
other independent variables namely, board independence, board size, board meetings, CEO duality, firm’s size, 
leverage, profitability, firm’s age and industry type factor is used as control variable. Table 3.2 shows the 
measurements of independent variables.  
CSRD = α0 + β1Boardsize+ β2 Boardind + β3 Boardme + β4 Duality + β5 ROE + β6Logasset + β7 Lever+ 
β8 Age + β9 Ind + ε 
 
Where, 
CSRD is the corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
Boardsize is the board size of the firm. 
Boardind is the percentage of non-executive directors to total directors. 
Boardme is the number of board meetings through the year. 
Duality is the CEO duality. 
ROE is the return on equity, it is the proxy of profitability. 
Logasset is the log of total assets, it is proxy of firm’s size.  
Lever is the leverage. 
Age is the firm’s age. 
Ind is the dummy variable for industry sectors.  
ε is the error term. 
 
Table 3.1: Sample of the Study 
Num. Sector name 
Total number of listed 
firms 
Firms with availability 
data 
% of study taken 
firms 
1 Petrochemical industries 14 14 100% 
2 Cement 14 12 ~93% 
3 Retail 15 9 ~60% 
4 Energy and Utilities 2 2 100% 
5 Agriculture and Food industries 16 16 100% 
6 Telecommunication and IT 4 3 ~93% 
7 Multi-investment 7 7 100% 
8 Industrial investment 15 14 ~93% 
9 Building and Construction 17 15 100% 
10 Real Estate Development 8 8 100% 
11 Transportation  4 4 100% 
12 Media and Publishing 3 2 ~93% 
13 Hotel and Tourism 4 3 ~93% 
 Total 123 109   
Note: Banking and Insurance sectors are excluded.  
 
Table 3.2: shows the operationalization of independent variables.   
Independent variables  Measurements  
Board Size  The number of directors on firm’s board.  
Board Independence  The number of non-executive directors to total of directors.    
Board Meetings  The number of board meetings through the year.  
CEO Duality  
Dummy variable for the chairman of the board, where it will give “1” if the CEO has also 
chairman position of the board, and “0” otherwise.   
Profitability ROE is used as a proxy of profitability, It is measured by net income divided by total 
equity  
Firm’s Size Log of total assets is used as a proxy of firm’s size.  
Leverage It is measured by total debt to total equity ratio (DTE).  
Firm’s Age The listing age of the firm. 
Control variable Measurements 
Industry Type It is a dummy variable classified to 13 industries and Hotel and Tourism sector is the 
benchmark.  
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4. Result and Analysis:  
I used the EViews 9 Statistic Software for obtaining the results, deriving descriptive statistics, correlation 
test and coefficient estimation by employing the ordinary least squares OLS method. According to Gujarati 
(2004, p. 109) in case of large data, the sample has an approximately normal distribution function regarding 
central limit theorem. Based on the previous result and following to Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014), documenting 
that the normality of sample is not a problem. Table 4.1 reflects that the mean of CSRD index in the sample 
during the period under study was around .112547 with the highest and lowest value of .603175 and .007937 
respectively. The standard deviation statistic for the said variable is .064176 reflecting low degree of volatility. 
The age parameter has average value of 26.56083 and the range of the age in the sample is 2.1 to 60.11, the 
standard deviation for age 13.88230 is high. The average of board independence is found to be .504598 with the 
maximum and minimum value of 2.3 and 0 respectively, the standard deviation is .206923. The mean of board 
meetings is 5.429448 and it ranged between 0 to 19 and the standard deviation for board meetings is found to be 
2.415257. The mean of board size is found to be 8.475460 with the maximum and minimum value of 14 and 3 
respectively and the standard deviation of the parameter is 1.696425. The mean of the CEO duality is .641104 
while the maximum and minimum are 0 and 1 respectively with standard deviation of 0.480414. Finally, the 
mean of log total assets, leverage and return on equity is 6.388894, 0.839266 and 0.625844 respectively. The 
maximum rate of log total assets is 9.4943 while the minimum is 4.290449, and its standard deviation is 
0.797811. Moreover, the leverage has a range between -23.53967 to 25.28094 with standard deviation 2.633302. 
Return on equity has the highest value of 169.2059 while the lowest value is -9.839492 and its standard 
deviation is 9.385730. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 
CSRD 
INDEX AGE 
BOARDIN
D 
BOARDM
E 
BOARDSIZ
E 
DUALIT
Y 
LOGASSET
S LEVER ROE 
Mean 
0.11254
7 
26.5608
3 
0.504598 5.429448 8.475460 0.641104 6.388894 
0.83926
6 
0.62584
4 
Median 
0.10317
5 
24.6000
0 
0.444444 5.000000 9.000000 1.000000 6.330041 
0.51773
0 
0.10322
6 
Maximum 
0.60317
5 
60.1100
0 
2.333333 19.000000 14.000000 1.000000 9.494300 
25.2809
4 
169.205
9 
Minimum 
0.00793
7 
2.10000
0 
0.000000 0.000000 3.000000 0.000000 4.290449 -23.5396 -9.83949 
Std. Dev. 
0.06417
6 
13.8823
0 
0.206923 2.415257 1.696425 0.480414 0.797811 
2.63330
2 
9.38573
0 
Observatio
n 
326 326 326 326 326 326 326 326 326 
 
Table 4.2 shows the correlation analysis for all variables with CSRD index. It is found that the log total 
assets variable is significantly and positively correlated (corr =.362 at .05 level) with CSRD index. Similarly, 
ROE, dummy variable of energy industry and dummy variable of petrochemical industry has significant positive 
correlation with CSRD index (corr =.266, corr =.244 and corr =.234 respectively all at .05 level). While board 
independence is negatively correlated (corr =-.158 at .o1 level) and other dummy variables such as multi-
investment and real-estate industries have a negative correlation (corr =-.151 and corr =-.161respectively at .01 
level). Moreover, the correlations between independent variables indicate that there is no multicollinearity 
problem, as no bivariate correlation exceeds the value of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2004: 359). 
Table 4.3 shows the Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test to prove the appropriateness of the model. 
The output of OLS regression is shown in table 4.4. R-sq indicates that the influence of independent variables 
on the dependent variables. It found that the independent variables determine 23% of the CSRD index i.e., more 
than 23% of the relationship with CSRD index can be determined by the nine independent variables. The F-
value is 4.602085 at significance of 0.000, which means that 23% of the variance of CSRD index for the listed 
Saudi companies had been significantly explained by the nine independent variables. The coefficients of the 
regression analysis as presented in table 4.4 reflects that five variables namely, return on equity (ROE), log total 
assets, dummy of energy industry, dummy of real-estate and dummy of multi-investment industry are significant 
at the 5% confidence level. The Durbin-Watson test has value of 2.623489 that indicates an absence of 
autocorrelation problems in the model.    
 
Table 4.3: Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test.  
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random 12.544766 8 0.1285  
Cross-section random effects test comparisons 
Variable Fixed Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
Age 0.001029 0.000154 0.000002 0.5381 
Boardind 0.010982 -0.007401 0.000092 0.0553 
Boardme -0.000068 -0.000307 0.000001 0.8132 
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Boardsize -0.001867 -0.001358 0.000006 0.8387 
duality -0.003455 -0.001940 0.000003 0.3380 
ROE 0.001507 0.001532 0.000000 0.7902 
Logasset 0.008390 0.023491 0.000029 0.0049 
Lever -0.002664 -0.001406 0.000002 0.3424 
 
Table 4.4:  OLS regression analysis. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
AGE 0.000154 0.000346 0.444860 0.6567 
BOARDIND -0.007401 0.015736 -0.470302 0.6385 
BOARDME -0.000307 0.001438 -0.213407 0.8312 
BOARDSIZE -0.001358 0.002371 -0.572476 0.5674 
DUALITY -0.001940 0.004731 -0.410005 0.6821 
ROE 0.001532 0.000268 5.708172 0.0000 
LOGASSETS 0.023491 0.005675 4.139536 0.0000 
LEVER -0.001406 0.001379 -1.019541 0.3088 
ENRGY 0.082599 0.042293 1.953012 0.0517 
CONS -0.030142 0.028708 -1.049974 0.2946 
TRASP 0.009759 0.034498 0.282878 0.7775 
TELE -0.040935 0.039171 -1.045052 0.2968 
RETIAL -0.016120 0.030010 -0.537132 0.5916 
REAL -0.056356 0.031510 -1.788498 0.0747 
PETRO 0.010269 0.029766 0.345000 0.7303 
MULTI_INV -0.042545 0.031342 -1.357465 0.1756 
MEDIA -0.020189 0.042364 -0.476553 0.6340 
IND_INV -0.014057 0.028803 -0.488054 0.6259 
FOOD 0.001024 0.028475 0.035959 0.9713 
CEMENT -0.003278 0.029481 -0.111184 0.9115 
C -0.010596 0.048744 -0.217375 0.8281 
 Effects Specification  
   S.D Rho 
Cross-section random 0.038767 0.4970 
Idiosyncratic random 0.039002 0.5030 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.231819 Mean dependent var 0.056580 
Adjusted R-squared 0.181446 S.D. dependent var 0.043418 
S.E. of regression 0.039281 Sum squared resid 0.470610 
F-statistic 4.602085 Durbin-Watson stat 2.623489 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted Statistics  
R-squared 0.330539 Mean dependent var 0.112547 
Sum squared resid 0.896086 Durbin-Watson stat 1.377815 
 
Table 4.5 contains a summary of the hypotheses tested and the findings from the regression analysis of the 
relationships between the CSRD index and corporate factors, namely, board size, board independence, board 
meetings, CEO duality, a firm’s size, leverage, profitability, age and industry type. The finding of a positive 
correlation on board Size, board meetings, firm’s size, leverage, profitability, firm’s age and industry type are 
consistent with the formulated hypotheses. Board independence has a negative correlation, this result is 
inconsistent with the formulated hypotheses. CEO duality has a weak negative correlation with CSR disclosure, 
this result is consistent with the formulated hypotheses and prior studies. Beginning with CG characteristics, the 
first hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and CSR 
disclosure. This implies that Saudi firms with boards dominated by independent directors play a limited role in 
influencing CSR disclosure. This is relevant to the research findings of (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005; Barako et al., 2006; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). This finding leads to the rejection of the first 
hypothesis. The result is not consistent with agency theory that suggests the presence of independent directors 
improves CG practices (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). While board size and board 
meetings present a non-statistically significant positive effect and CEO duality has a weak negative effect. 
These findings support Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Alhazaimeh et al. (2014) and Giannarakis (2014). These results 
lead us to accept hypotheses H2, H3 and H4. 
The other variables, firm’s size and profitability, have a significant positive effect on CSR disclosure, 
results consistent with Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012), Al-Janadi et al (2013) and Alturki (2014) on Saudi 
firms. Large firms disclose more voluntary information for reasons of accountability and visibility (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005). The significance of profitability is consistent with (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989). These results 
support hypothesis H5 and H7.  
Leverage and firm’s age also have a direct effect, but it is not econometrically important. This is relevant to 
the research findings of  (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Alturki, 2014 and Kansal et al. 2014). These results support 
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hypothesis H6 and H8. The control variable, Industry Type, is statistically related to CSR disclosure, this result 
consistent with Al-Janadi et al. (2013) on Saudi firms. This result leads us to accept hypotheses H9.  
 
Table 4.5: A summary of the hypotheses and findings. 
Dependent Variable The Saudi Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Index (CSRD) 
Explanatory variable 
No. 
Hypot-
hesis 
Expect- 
ed sign 
Finding sign 
Finding  
significance 
Hypothesis 
status 
Board Independence 1 + - 
Significant at the 
5% level 
Rejected 
Board Size 2 + + Insignificant Accepted 
Board Meetings 
 
3 + + Insignificant Accepted 
CEO Duality 4 - - Insignificant Accepted 
Firm’s Size 
 
5 + + 
Significant at the 
5% level 
Accepted 
Leverage 
 
6 + + Insignificant Accepted 
Profitability 7 + + 
Significant at the 
5% level 
Accepted 
Firm’s Age 8 + + Insignificant Accepted 
Control variable      
Industry Type 9 + + 
Significant at the 
5% level 
Accepted 
 
Conclusion:  
To recapitulate, this present study investigated the relationship between the extent of CSR disclosure in 
listed Saudi firms and corporate factors, namely, board size, board independence, board meetings, CEO duality, 
firm’s size, leverage, age and profitability. The paper used a sample of 109 firms listed on Saudi Stock 
Exchange Market (Tadawul) drawn from thirteen sectors which are Petrochemical, Cement, Retail, Energy and 
Utilities, Agriculture and Food, Telecommunication and IT, Multi-investment, Industrial Investment, Building 
and Construction, Real Estate Development, Transportation, Media and Publishing and the Hotel and Tourism 
sector. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method has been used to test the eight research hypotheses developed 
for the purpose of the study. 
The results show that profitability and firm’s size factor have a positive and significant association with 
CSR disclosure in listed Saudi firms. The argument supports the view that firms which have solid financial 
performance and large size have more CSR activities. Furthermore, proﬁtable firms use CSR disclosures as a 
mean to improve their image and legitimize their corporate initiatives. Also, large sized firms are more visible to 
the public eye and they devote more ﬁnancial resources to social initiatives promoting a positive corporate 
image. While CG characteristics have no impact on CSR disclosure except board independence which has a 
negative impact, and these results similar to earlier studies (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; 
Barako et al., 2006; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). Furthermore, the results indicate that industry affiliation 
is an important driver of CSR disclosure in KSA. The most polluted sectors “Energy and Petrochemical sectors” 
in the country have CSR index compare with other sectors. This indicates that Saudi firms operating in 
environmentally-sensitive industries are associated with a higher CSR disclosures. The reason for the higher 
CSR disclosure could be the high levels of public concern about environmental issues. According to Deegan and 
Gordon (1996), firms with a high impact on the environment are exposed to pressure from lobby groups in 
society who are trying to persuade the government to impose costs on those firms which have poor 
environmental performance. Therefore, those firms have to provide more information on their annual reports to 
avoid these costs.     
According to plausible check that is used by the present study, the average of CSRD index among Saudi 
firms is too low, it is about 11% that means Saudi firms disclose 11% of the information that they have to 
provide for stockholders according to GRI guidelines. But we cannot compare this result to other studies that 
have been done in Middle Eastern countries because no study employed GRI to rate sustainability reporting. 
According to Mandurah et al. (2012), CSR is in its early stage of development among Saudi firms. The concept 
of CSR seems to be more philanthropic and based on the religious background of the society. 
There are very few Saudi firms committed to GRI guidelines and who present their annual reports on 
www.database.globalreporting.org the official website of GRI, these firms such as Savola Group, Saudi 
Electricity Co, Saudi Basic Industries, Saudi Arabian Mining and Almarai Co. In addition, the most prevalent 
action with regard to the social dimension of CSR among Saudi firms is Zaka, which is an obligation instead of 
tax imposed by government for all listed Saudi firms. Regarding the environmental dimension, most Saudi firms 
pay more attention to water resources and reducing water consumption.    
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This study has a number of limitations. First, I used eight factors to investigate the drivers of CSR 
disclosure in my study. Second, I used data for the period of 2012-2014 for thirteen sectors out of fifteen 
sectors; financial sectors were excluded due to their distinctive disclosure.  
 
7. Further Research: 
This research topic has been extensively explored in developed economies. However, little research tests 
the determinants of CSR reporting in emerging countries. This paper provides more information of CSR drivers 
in Saudi firms but it is still limited. I recommend future researchers to investigate more factors to demonstrate 
clearly the drivers of CSR in the KSA. Future researchers can investigate the commitment of Islam as a factor 
and identify how it is related to the performance of Saudi firms. Also, Future studies could seek to more robust 
by exploring in other emerging countries the relationship represented in this paper. 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 3.1: the construction of CSRD index items.  
  CHECK LIST  
  Items/companies 
  CATEGORY: ENVIRONMENTAL 
1 Aspect: Materials  
2 Aspect: Energy 
3 Aspect: Water 
4 Aspect: Biodiversity 
5 Aspect: Emissions 
6 Aspect: Effluents and waste    
7 Aspect: Products and services  
8 Aspect: Compliance "fines and sanction for non-compliance" 
9 Aspect: Transport 
10 Aspect: Total environmental protection expenditures andinvestment 
11 Aspect : Supplier environmental assessment  
12 Aspect: Environmental grievance mechanisms  
  CATEGORY:SOCIAL 
  SUB-CATEGORY: Labor Practices and Decent Work        
13 Aspect: Employment 
14 Aspect: Labor/Management relations  
15 Aspect: Occupational health and safety 
16 Aspect: Training and education  
17 Aspect: Diversity and equal opportunity "Composition of Governance body" 
18 Aspect: Equal remuneration for women and men 
19 Aspect: Supplier assessment for labor practices 
20 Aspect: Labor practices grievance mechanisms  
  SUB-CATEGORY: Human Rights       
21 Aspect: Investment  
22 Aspect: Non-discrimination 
23 Aspect: Freedom of association and collective bargaining  
24 Aspect: Child labor  
25 Aspect: Forced or compulsory labor 
26 Aspect: Security practices  
27 Aspect: Indigenous rights  
28 Aspect: Assessment of operations that included human rights review 
29 Aspect: Supplier human rights assessment  
 
30 Aspect: Human rights grievance mechanisms  
  SUB-CATEGORY: Society 
31 Aspect: Local communities  
32 Aspect: Anti-corruption  
33 Aspect: Public policy 
34 Aspect: Anti-competitive behavior  
35 Aspect: Compliance "fines and sanction for non-compliance" 
36 Aspect: Supplier assessment for impact on society. 
37 Aspect: Grievance mechanisms for impacts on society.  
  SUB-CATEGORY: Product Responsibility 
38 Aspect: Customer health and safety 
39 Aspect: Product and service labeling  
40 Aspect: Marketing communication 
41 Aspect: Customer privacy 
42 Aspect: Compliance  "fines and sanction for non-compliance" 
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Table 4.2: The Correlation Analysis. 
 
CSR
D 
Index 
Leve
r 
RO
E 
Boardin
d 
Boardsi
ze 
Board
me 
dualit
y 
Age 
Logasse
ts 
food 
ceme
nt 
con
s 
CSRD 
Index 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
1            
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
            
Leverag
e 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.058 1           
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.295            
ROE 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.266*
* 
.032 1          
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .565           
Boardin
d 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
-
.158*
* 
-
.231*
* 
-
.029 
1         
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.004 .000 .601          
Boardsiz
e 
 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.068 .112* .083 -.261** 1        
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.222 .042 .135 .000         
Boardm
ee 
 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.074 .105 .034 -.075 .087 1       
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.182 .058 .543 .176 .115        
CEO 
duality 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.001 .015 .041 -.071 -.030 .036 1      
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.981 .785 .458 .199 .592 .512       
Age 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.045 
-
.095 
.031 .043 -.110* .184** .004 1     
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.415 .087 .573 .438 .047 .001 .946      
Logasset
s 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.362*
* 
.240*
* 
.073 -.298** .369** .158** -.054 
-
.153*
* 
1    
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .187 .000 .000 .004 .331 .005     
food 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.043 
-
.227*
* 
.134
* 
.130* -.115* .052 -.015 .085 -.320** 1   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.434 .000 .015 .019 .037 .345 .789 .123 .000    
cement 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.044 .038 
-
.014 
-.140* -.017 .149** .018 
.268*
* 
-.007 
-
.146*
* 
1  
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.424 .496 .799 .011 .759 .007 .746 .000 .905 .008   
cons 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
-.104 
-
.050 
-
.018 
.018 .078 -.074 -.017 .062 .019 
-
.166*
* 
-.141* 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.059 .367 .739 .750 .161 .181 .764 .265 .727 .003 .011  
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Table 4.2: Continued 
 
CS
RD 
Ind
ex 
Le
ver 
R
O
E 
Boar
dind 
Boar
dsize 
Boar
dme 
dua
lity 
Ag
e 
Loga
ssets 
foo
d 
ce
me
nt 
co
ns 
enr
gy 
ind 
me
dia 
m
ult
i 
in
v 
pe
tro 
re
al 
ret
ial 
te
le 
tra
sp 
enr
gy 
Pears
on 
Correl
atio 
.24
4** 
.06
7 
-
.0
08 
-.066 .083 
.250
** 
.05
5 
.05
2 
.155*
* 
-
.05
7 
-
.04
8 
-
.05
5 
1         
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.00
0 
.22
6 
.8
89 
.232 .134 .000 
.32
6 
.34
4 
.005 
.30
7 
.38
6 
.32
5 
         
ind
inv 
Pears
on 
Correl
ation 
-
.04
3 
.01
3 
-
.0
21 
.000 
-
.150*
* 
-
.094 
.00
1 
-
.05
1 
-
.115* 
-
.15
9** 
-
.13
5* 
-
.15
3** 
-
.05
2 
1        
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.44
0 
.80
9 
.7
05 
1.00
0 
.007 .089 
.99
2 
.35
5 
.038 
.00
4 
.01
5 
.00
5 
.34
4 
        
me
dia 
Pears
on 
Correl
ation 
-
.02
7 
.04
3 
-
.0
08 
-.005 
.177*
* 
.033 
-
.08
8 
-
.16
3** 
.009 
-
.05
7 
-
.04
8 
-
.05
5 
-
.01
9 
-
.05
2 
1       
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.62
8 
.43
9 
.8
79 
.925 .001 .557 
.11
2 
.00
3 
.868 
.30
7 
.38
6 
.32
5 
.73
6 
.34
4 
       
mu
lti 
inv 
Pears
on 
Correl
ation 
-
.15
1** 
.14
1* 
-
.0
31 
-
.109* 
-.051 
-
.041 
.01
3 
.03
9 
-.079 
-
.10
9* 
-
.09
2 
-
.10
5 
-
.03
6 
-
.10
1 
-
.03
6 
1      
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.00
6 
.01
1 
.5
71 
.049 .360 .459 
.81
0 
.47
9 
.156 
.05
0 
.09
6 
.05
9 
.51
9 
.06
9 
.51
9 
      
pet
ro 
Pears
on 
Correl
ation 
.23
4** 
.14
2* 
-
.0
21 
-.082 .082 
-
.182
** 
.00
1 
-
.18
3** 
.388*
* 
-
.15
9** 
-
.13
5* 
-
.15
3** 
-
.05
2 
-
.14
7** 
-
.05
2 
-
.1
01 
1     
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.00
0 
.01
0 
.7
05 
.139 .138 .001 
.99
2 
.00
1 
.000 
.00
4 
.01
5 
.00
5 
.34
4 
.00
8 
.34
4 
.0
69 
     
rea
l 
Pears
on 
Correl
ation 
-
.16
1** 
-
.05
3 
-
.0
17 
.049 
.240*
* 
.028 
-
.03
5 
-
.17
9** 
.154*
* 
-
.11
7* 
-
.09
9 
-
.11
2* 
-
.03
8 
-
.10
8 
-
.03
8 
-
.0
74 
-
.1
08 
1    
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.00
4 
.33
6 
.7
61 
.381 .000 .611 
.53
3 
.00
1 
.005 
.03
5 
.07
4 
.04
2 
.48
8 
.05
1 
.48
8 
.1
84 
.0
51 
    
reti
al 
Pears
on 
Correl
ation 
-
.06
6 
-
.01
0 
-
.0
13 
.112* 
-
.182*
* 
-
.113
* 
.01
5 
.02
0 
-
.182*
* 
-
.12
4* 
-
.10
6 
-
.12
0* 
-
.04
1 
-
.11
5* 
-
.04
1 
-
.0
79 
-
.1
15
* 
-
.0
8
4 
1   
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.23
5 
.85
9 
.8
17 
.043 .001 .041 
.78
3 
.71
4 
.001 
.02
4 
.05
7 
.03
0 
.46
0 
.03
7 
.46
0 
.1
56 
.0
37 
.1
2
8 
   
tel
e 
Pears
on 
Correl
ation 
-
.01
0 
.04
7 
-
.0
11 
-
.124* 
.130* 
.211
** 
.04
8 
-
.19
9** 
.274*
* 
-
.07
0 
-
.05
9 
-
.06
7 
-
.02
3 
-
.06
5 
-
.02
3 
-
.0
44 
-
.0
65 
-
.0
4
7 
-
.0
50 
1  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.85
7 
.39
4 
.8
49 
.025 .019 .000 
.39
1 
.00
0 
.000 
.20
8 
.28
6 
.22
6 
.67
9 
.24
4 
.67
9 
.4
27 
.2
44 
.3
9
3 
.3
63 
  
tra
sp 
Pears
on 
Correl
ation 
.05
6 
-
.01
5 
-
.0
10 
.018 .013 .094 
.01
0 
.06
5 
-.037 
-
.08
1 
-
.06
9 
-
.07
8 
-
.02
7 
-
.07
5 
-
.02
7 
-
.0
51 
-
.0
75 
-
.0
5
5 
-
.0
59 
-
.0
3
3 
1 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.31
0 
.79
0 
.8
55 
.739 .815 .090 
.85
8 
.24
3 
.503 
.14
4 
.21
6 
.16
0 
.63
1 
.17
6 
.63
1 
.3
57 
.1
76 
.3
2
2 
.2
91 
.5
5
4 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Albassam, W., 2014. Corporate Governance, Voluntary Disclosure and Financial Performance: An 
Empirical Analysis of Saudi Listed Firms Using a Mixed-Methods Research Design. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Glasgow, UK. 
Alhazaimeh, A., R. Palaniappan and M. Almsafir, 2014. The impact of corporate governance and 
ownership structure on voluntary disclosure in annual reports among listed Jordanian companies. Procedia-
Social and Behavioral Sciences, 129: 341-348. 
Al-Janadi, Y., R.A. Rahman and N.H. Omar, 2013. Corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 4(4). 
Aljifri, K., 2008. Annual report disclosure in a developing country: The case of the UAE. Advances in 
Accounting, 24(1): 93-100. 
Aljifri, K., A. Alzarouni, C. Ng and M.I. Tahir, 2014. The Association Between Firm Characteristics and 
Corporate Financial Disclosures: Evidence From Uae Companies. International Journal of Business and Finance 
Research, 8(2): 101-123.  
Aljifri, K., and K. Hussainey, 2007. The determinants of forward-looking information in annual reports of 
UAE companies. Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(9): 881-894. http://doi.org/10.1108/02686900710829390 
16                                                                        Ayman I. F. Issa, 2017 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 11(10) July 2017, Pages: 1-19 
 
Allegrini, M. and G. Greco, 2013. Corporate Boards, Audit Committees and Voluntary Disclosure: 
Evidence from Italian Listed Companies’, Journal of Management and Governance, 17(1): 187-216. 
Al-Moataz, E., and K. Hussainey, 2012. Determinants of corporate governance disclosure in Saudi 
companies. Journal of Economics and Management, 5(1): 52-84. 
Alsaeed, K., 2006. The association between firm-specific characteristics and disclosure: The case of Saudi 
Arabia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(5): 476-496. 
Alsaif, T., 2015. An investigation into the relationship and integration between strategic quality 
management and corporate social responsibility: the case of some Saudi Arabian organisations (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Portsmouth). 
Alshehri, A., and J. Solomon, 2012. The evolution of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. In Conference 
Paper. 
Alturki, K.H., 2014. Voluntary Disclosure by Saudi Companies. Research Journal of Finance and 
Accounting, 5(20): 77-95. 
Arcay, M.R.B. and M.F.M. Vazquez, 2005. Corporate characteristics, governance rules and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in Spain. Advances in Accounting, 21: 299-331. 
Barac, Z.A., M. Granic and T. Vuko, 2014. The Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure in Croatia. World 
Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology. International Journal of Social, Behavioral, Educational, 
Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering, 8(4): 1057-1063. 
Barako, D.G., and G. Tower, 2007. Corporate governance and bank performance: Does ownership matter? 
Evidence from Kenyan banking sector. Corporate Ownership and Control, 4(2): 133-144. 
Barkemeyer, R., L. Preuss and L. Lee, 2015. On the effectiveness of private transnational governance 
regimes—Evaluating corporate sustainability reporting according to the Global Reporting Initiative. Journal of 
World Business, 50(2): 312-325. 
Basuony, M.A., and E.K. Mohamed, 2014. Determinants of internet financial disclosure in GCC countries. 
Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting, 6(1): 70. 
Bathala, C.T. and R.P. Rao, 1995. The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective. 
Managerial and decision economics, 16(1): 59-69. 
Bathala, C.T. and R.P. Rao, 1995. The determinants of board composition: an agency theory perspective. 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 16: 59-69. 
Beasley, M.S., 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and 
financial statement fraud. Accounting review, pp: 443-465. 
Belkaoui, A., and P.G. Karpik, 1989. Determinants of the corporate decision to disclose social information. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 2(1).  
Bendickson, J., J. Muldoon, E. Liguori and P.E. Davis, 2016. Agency theory: the times they are a-changing. 
Management Decision, 54(1). 
Bhambu, M.K., 2015. Corporate Social Responsibility: Mission Possible. Unpublished manuscript.  
Boyd, B.K., 1995. CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic Management 
Journal, 16(4): 301-312. 
Brown, H.S., M. De Jong and T. Lessidrenska, 2009. The rise of the Global Reporting Initiative: a case of 
institutional entrepreneurship. Environmental Politics, 18(2): 182-200. 
Brown, S., S.A. Hillegeist and K. Lo, 2004. Conference calls and information asymmetry. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 37(3): 343-366. 
Chalevas, C.G., 2011. The effect of the mandatory adoption of corporate governance mechanisms on 
executive compensation. The International Journal of Accounting, 46(2): 138-174. 
Chan, M.C., J. Watson and D. Woodliff, 2014. Corporate governance quality and CSR disclosures. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 125(1): 59-73. 
Cheng, E.C., and S.M. Courtenay, 2006. Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. 
The international journal of accounting, 41(3): 262-289. 
Choi, J.S., 1999. An investigation of the initial voluntary environmental disclosures made in Korean semi-
annual financial reports. Pacific Accounting Review, 11(1): 73-102. 
Christopher, T., Y.B.S. Hutomo and G. Monroe, 1997. Voluntary environmental disclosure by Australian 
listed mineral mining companies: an application of stakeholder theory. The International Journal of Accounting 
and Business Society, 5(1): 42-65. 
Clarkson, M.E., 1995. A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social performance. 
Academy of management review, 20(1): 92-117. 
Clarkson, P.M., Y. Li, G.D. Richardson and F.P. Vasvari, 2008. Revisiting the relation between 
environmental performance and environmental disclosure: An empirical analysis. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 33(4-5): 303-327. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2007.05.003 
Cooke, T.E., 1992. The impact of size, stock market listing and industry type on disclosure in the annual 
reports of Japanese listed corporations. Accounting and Business Research, 22(87): 229-237. 
17                                                                        Ayman I. F. Issa, 2017 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 11(10) July 2017, Pages: 1-19 
 
Core, J.E., R.W. Holthausen and D.F. Larcker, 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer 
compensation, and firm performance. Journal of financial economics, 51(3): 371-406. 
Cormier, D., M. Magnan and B. Van Velthoven, 2005. Environmental disclosure quality in large German 
companies: economic incentives, public pressures or institutional conditions?. European accounting review, 
14(1): 3-39. 
Diamond, D.W. and R.E. Verrecchia, 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. The journal of 
Finance, 46(4): 1325-1359. 
Donaldson, L., and J.H. Davis, 1994. Boards and company performance‐research challenges the 
conventional wisdom. Corporate governance: An international review, 2(3): 151-160. 
Donaldson, T., and L.E. Preston, 1995. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence, and 
implications. Academy of management Review, 20(1): 65-91. 
Doukas, J.A., C. Kim and C. Pantzalis, 2000. Security analysis, agency costs, and company characteristics. 
Financial Analysts Journal, 56(6): 54-63. 
Doukas, J.A., C. Kim and C. Pantzalis, 2000. Security analysis, agency costs, and company characteristics. 
Financial Analysts Journal, pp: 54-63. 
Dye, R.A., and S.S. Sridhar, 1995. Industry-wide disclosure dynamics. Journal of Accounting research, 
157-174. 
Echave, J.O. and S.S. Bhati, 2010. Determinants of social and environmental disclosures by Spanish 
companies. GSMI Third Annual International Business Conference (Global Strategic Management, Michigan, 
USA), pp: 55-68. 
Eisenberg, T., S. Sundgren and M.T. Wells, 1998. Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small 
firms. Journal of financial economics, 48(1): 35-54. 
Emmanuel, G.L., V. Pled, 2012. Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting: Evidence from 
Environmentally Sensitive Industries in the USA. International Review of Accounting, Banking and Finance, 4 
(2): 61-99. 
Eng, L.L. and Y.T. Mak, 2003. Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of accounting and 
public policy, 22(4): 325-345. 
Esa, E., and N. Anum Mohd Ghazali, 2012. Corporate social responsibility and corporate governance in 
Malaysian government-linked companies. The international journal of business in society, 12(3): 292-305. 
Esa, E., and N.A.M. Ghazali, 2012. Corporate social responsibility and corporate governance in Malaysian 
government‐linked companies. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 12(3): 
292-305. http://doi.org/10.1108/14720701211234564 
Etzion, D., and F. Ferraro, 2010. The role of analogy in the institutionalization of sustainability reporting. 
Organization Science, 21(5): 1092-1107. http://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1090.0494 
Fama, E.F., and M.C. Jensen, 1983. Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26(2): 301-325. 
Finkelstein, S., and R.A. D'aveni, 1994. CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How boards of directors 
balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management journal, 37(5): 1079-1108. 
Font, X., A. Walmsley, S. Cogotti, L. McCombes and N. Häusler, 2012. Corporate social responsibility: 
The disclosure–performance gap. Tourism Management 33(6): 1544-1553. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2012.02.012 
Freeman, R.E., and W.M. Evan, 1990. Corporate governance: A stakeholder interpretation. Journal of 
behavioral economics, 19(4): 337-359. 
Freeman, R. Edward, and Robert A. Phillips, 2002. Stakeholder theory: A libertarian defense. Business 
ethics quarterly, 12(03): 331-349. 
Gamerschlag, R., K. Möller and F. Verbeeten, 2011. Determinants of voluntary CSR disclosure: empirical 
evidence from Germany. Review of Managerial Science, 5(2-3): 233-262.  
Giannarakis, G., 2014. Corporate governance and financial characteristic effects on the extent of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure. Social Responsibility Journal, 10(4): 569-590. 
Gill, D.L., S.J. Dickinson and A. Scharl, 2008. Communicating sustainability: A web content analysis of 
North American, Asian and European firms. Journal of Communication Management, 12(3): 243-262. 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)., 2013. Sustainability reporting guidelines. Retrieved from 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-
Disclosures.pdf 
Graves, S.B., and S.A. Waddock, 1994. Institutional owners and corporate social performance. Academy of 
Management journal, 37(4): 1034-1046. 
Gujarati, D., 2004. Basic Econometrics. New York: MeGraw-Hill, pp: 363-369. 
Gul, F.A., and S. Leung, 2004. Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate 
disclosures. Journal of Accounting and public Policy, 23(5): 351-379. 
Guthrie, J., and I. Abeysekera, 2006. Content analysis of social, environmental reporting: what is new?. 
18                                                                        Ayman I. F. Issa, 2017 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 11(10) July 2017, Pages: 1-19 
 
Journal of Human Resource Costing and Accounting 10(2): 114-126. 
http://doi.org/10.1108/14013380610703120 
Habbash, M., K. Hussainey and A.E. Awad, 2016. The determinants of voluntary disclosure in Saudi 
Arabia: an empirical study. International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, 12(3): 
213-236. 
Habbash, M., 2016. Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: Evidence from 
Saudi Arabia. Journal of Economic and Social Development, 3(1): 87-103.  
Haniffa, R.M., and T.E. Cooke, 2005. The impact of culture and governance on corporate social reporting. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24(5): 391-430. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2005.06.001 
Haß, L.H., S. Vergauwe and Q. Zhang, 2014. Corporate governance and the information environment: 
Evidence from Chinese stock markets. International Review of Financial Analysis, 36: 106-119. 
Haß, L.H., S. Vergauwe and Q. Zhang, 2014. Corporate governance and the information environment: 
Evidence from Chinese stock markets. International Review of Financial Analysis 36: 106-119. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2014.03.010 
Healy, P.M. and K.G. Palepu, 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: 
A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of accounting and economics, 31(1): 405-440. 
Hill, C.W. and T.M. Jones, 1992. Stakeholder‐agency theory. Journal of management studies, 29(2): 131-
154. 
Hillman, A.J., and T. Dalziel, 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and 
resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 383-396. 
Hossain, M., 2008. The extent of disclosure in annual reports of banking companies: The case of India. 
European Journal of Scientific Research, 23(4): 659-680. 
Hossain, M., and M. Reaz, 2007. The determinants and characteristics of voluntary disclosure by Indian 
banking companies. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 14(5): 274-288.  
Hussainey, K.S.M., 2004. A study of the ability of (partially) automated disclosure scores to explain the 
information content of annual report narratives for future earnings. (Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Manchester). 
Hussainey, K., and A. Salama, 2010. The importance of corporate environmental reputation to investors. 
Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 11(3): 229-241. 
Hussainey, K., M. Elsayed and M. Razik, 2011. Factors Affecting Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosure in Egypt. Corporate Ownership and Control, 8(4): 432-443. 
Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4): 305-360. 
Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4): 305-360. 
Ji-ming, L.J.L., and W.Z.W. Zhao-hua, 2009. An empirical study of the relationship between corporate 
dividend policy and financial performance of chinese listed companies. International Colloquium on Computing, 
Communication, Control, and Management, 1: 190-193. http://doi.org/10.1109/CCCM.2009.5270472 
Kansal, M., M. Joshi and G.S. Batra, 2014. Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosures: 
Evidence from India. Advances in Accounting, 30(1): 217-229. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2014.03.009 
Karagiorgos, T., 2010. Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: An empirical analysis on 
Greek companies. European Research Studies, 13(4): 85. 
Khan, H.U.Z., 2010. The effect of corporate governance elements on corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
reporting: Empirical evidence from private commercial banks of Bangladesh. International Journal of Law and 
Management, 52(2): 82-109. 
Khan, S.A., K.A. Al-Maimani and W.A. Al-Yafi, 2013. Exploring corporate social responsibility in Saudi 
Arabia: The challenges ahead. Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics, 10(3): 65. 
Khurshid, M.A., A. Al-Aali and A.R. Ibrahim, 2014. Awareness of corporate social responsibility in an 
emerging economy. International Proceedings of Economics Development and Research, 69: 99. 
Klai, N., and A. Omri, 2011. Corporate governance and financial reporting quality: The case of Tunisian 
firms. International Business Research, 4(1): 158. 
Klein, A., 1998. Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure. Journal of Law and Economics, 41(1): 
275-304. 
Kolsi, M.C., 2012. The determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure: Evidence from the Tunisian capital 
market. IUP Journal of Accounting Research and Audit Practices, 11(4): 49. 
Krechovská, M., and P.T. Procházková, 2014. Sustainability and its Integration into Corporate Governance 
Focusing on Corporate Performance Management and Reporting. Procedia Engineering, 69: 1144-1151. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2014.03.103 
Laksmana, I., 2008. Corporate board governance and voluntary disclosure of executive compensation 
practices. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(4): 1147-1182. 
19                                                                        Ayman I. F. Issa, 2017 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 11(10) July 2017, Pages: 1-19 
 
Letza, S., X. Sun and J. Kirkbride, 2004. Shareholding versus stakeholding: A critical review of corporate 
governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3): 242-262. 
Lipton, M., and J.W. Lorsch, 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. The business 
lawyer, pp: 59-77. 
Luoma, P., and J. Goodstein, 1999. Research Notes. Stakeholders and corporate boards: Institutional 
influences on board composition and structure. Academy of management journal, 42(5): 553-563. 
Mandurah, S., J. Khatib and S. Al-Sabaan, 2012. Corporate social responsibility among Saudi Arabian 
firms: An empirical investigation. Journal of Applied Business Research, 28(5): 1049. 
Mandurah, S., J. Khatib and S. Al-Sabaan, 2012. Corporate Social Responsibility Among Saudi Arabian 
Firms: An Empirical Investigation. The Journal of Applied Business Research, 28(5): 1049-1058. 
Mariq, S.M., 2009. An Assessment of Voluntary Disclosure in the Annual Reports of Saudi Joint Stock 
Companies. Economics and Administration, 23(1). 
Meek, G.K., C.B. Roberts and S.J. Gray, 1995. Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by 
US, UK and continental European multinational corporations. Journal of international business studies, 26(3): 
555-572. 
Mehran, H., 1995. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of financial 
economics, 38(2): 163-184. 
Michelon, G., and A. Parbonetti, 2012. The effect of corporate governance on sustainability disclosure. 
Journal of Management and Governance, 16(3): 477-509. 
Mitchell, R.K., B.R. Agle and D.J. Wood, 1997. Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: 
Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of management review, 22(4): 853-886. 
Moura-Leite, R.C., and R.C. Padgett, 2011. Historical background of corporate social responsibility. Social 
Responsibility Journal, 7(4): 528-539. 
Murphy, K.J., 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis. Journal 
of accounting and economics, 7(1): 11-42. 
Neuendorf, K.A., 2002. The content analysis guidebook. Sage publications. 
Nicholson, G.J., and G.C. Kiel, 2007. Can Directors Impact Performance? A case‐based test of three 
theories of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4): 585-608. 
Nikolaj Bukh, P., C. Nielsen, P. Gormsen and J. Mouritsen, 2005. Disclosure of information on intellectual 
capital in Danish IPO prospectuses. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 18(6): 713-732. 
Ntim, C.G., and T. Soobaroyen, 2013. Black economic empowerment disclosures by South African listed 
corporations: The influence of ownership and board characteristics. Journal of business ethics, 116(1): 121-138. 
Nwanji, T.I. and K.E. Howell, 2007. Shareholdership, Stakeholdership and the Modem Global Business 
Environment: A Survey of the Literature. The Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 18: 310-361.  
O’riordan, L., and J. Fairbrass, 2008. Corporate social responsibility (CSR): Models and theories in 
stakeholder dialogue. Journal of Business Ethics, 83(4): 745-758. 
Owusu-Ansah, S., 1998. The impact of corporate attribites on the extent of mandatory disclosure and 
reporting by listed companies in Zimbabwe. The International Journal of Accounting, 33(5): 605-631. 
Owusu-Ansah, S., 1998. The impact of corporate attribites on the extent of mandatory disclosure and 
reporting by listed companies in Zimbabwe. The International Journal of Accounting, 33(5): 605-631. 
Pelucio-Grecco, M.C., C.M.S. Geron, G.B. Grecco and J.P.C. Lima, 2014. The effect of IFRS on earnings 
management in Brazilian non-financial public companies. Emerging Markets Review, 21: 42-66. 
Peters, S., M. Miller, and S. Kusyk, 2011. How relevant is corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility in emerging markets?. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, 
11(4): 429-445. 
Pfeffer, J., 1972. Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its 
environment. Administrative science quarterly, pp: 218-228. 
Phillips, R., 2003. Stakeholder theory and organizational ethics. Berrett-Koehler Publishers.  
Pled, V., and G.E. Iatridis, 2012. Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting: Evidence From 
Environmentally Sensitive Industries in The Usa. International Review of Accounting, Banking and Finance, 
4(2). 
Rahman, S., 2011. Evaluation of definitions: ten dimensions of corporate social responsibility. World 
Review of Business Research, 1(1): 166-176. 
Ramos, T.B., T. Cecílio, C.H. Douglas and S. Caeiro, 2013. Corporate sustainability reporting and the 
relations with evaluation and management frameworks: the Portuguese case. Journal of Cleaner Production, 52: 
317-328. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2013.03.002 
Rechner, P.L. and D.R. Dalton, 1991. CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis. 
Strategic Management Journal, 12(2): 155-160. 
Reverte, C., 2009. Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure ratings by Spanish listed firms. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 88(2): 351-366. 
20                                                                        Ayman I. F. Issa, 2017 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 11(10) July 2017, Pages: 1-19 
 
Roberts, R.W., 1992. Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure: An application of 
stakeholder theory. Accounting, organizations and society, 17(6): 595-612. 
Said, R., Y. Hj Zainuddin and H. Haron, 2009. The relationship between corporate social responsibility 
disclosure and corporate governance characteristics in Malaysian public listed companies. Social Responsibility 
Journal, 5(2): 212-226. 
Saleh, M., N. Zulkifli and R. Muhamad, 2008. An Empirical Examination of the Relationship between 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Financial Performance in an Emerging Market. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Samaha, K., H. Khlif and K. Hussainey, 2015. The impact of board and audit committee characteristics on 
voluntary disclosure: A meta-analysis. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 24: 13-28. 
Shehata, N.F., 2014. Theories and Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure. Accounting and Finance 
Research, 3(1): 18-26. http://doi.org/10.5430/afr.v3n1p18 
Shleifer, A., and R.W. Vishny, 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2): 737-
783. 
Solomon, J., 2007. Corporate governance and accountability. John Wiley and Sons. 
Spence, M., 1973. Job market signaling. The quarterly journal of Economics, 87(3): 355-374. 
Stiller, Y., and C.H. Daub, 2007. Paving the way for sustainability communication: evidence from a Swiss 
study. Business Strategy and the Environment, 16(7): 474-486. 
Sun, N.S.A., K. Hussainey and M. Habbash, 2010. Corporate environmental disclosure, corporate 
governance and earnings management. Managerial Auditing Journal, 25(7): 679-700. 
http://doi.org/10.1108/02686901011061351 
Suwaidan, M.S., 1997. Voluntary disclosure of accounting information: The case of Jordan (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Aberdeen). 
Tayşir, E.A., and Y. Pazarcık, 2013. Business Ethics, Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance: 
Does the Strategic Management Field Really Care about these Concepts?. Procedia - Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, 99: 294-303. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.10.497 
The World Bank., 2009. Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): Corporate Governance 
Country Assessment. Retrieved from 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/838731468106752813/pdf/625770WP0ROSC000Box0361486B0P
UBLIC0.pdf 
Toppinen, A., N. Li, A. Tuppura and Y. Xiong, 2012. Corporate Responsibility and Strategic Groups in the 
Forest‐based Industry: Exploratory Analysis based on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Framework. 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 19(4): 191-205. 
Uyar, A., M. Kilic and N. Bayyurt, 2013. Association between firm characteristics and corporate voluntary 
disclosure: Evidence from Turkish listed companies. Intangible Capital, 9(4): 1080-1112. 
http://doi.org/10.3926/ic.439 
Vafeas, N., 1999. Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of financial economics, 53(1): 
113-142. 
Wallace, R.O., K. Naser and A. Mora, 1994. The relationship between the comprehensiveness of corporate 
annual reports and firm characteristics in Spain. Accounting and business research, 25(97): 41-53. 
Walsh, J.P., and J.K. Seward, 1990. On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control 
mechanisms. Academy of management review, 15(3): 421-458. 
Wang, K., S. O and M.C. Claiborne, 2008. Determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure in an 
emerging market: Evidence from China. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 17: 14-30. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2008.01.001 
Webb, E., 2004. An examination of socially responsible firms’ board structure. Journal of Management and 
Governance, 8: 255-277. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-004-1107-0 
Wernerfelt, B., 1984. A resource‐based view of the firm. Strategic management journal, 5(2): 171-180. 
Wright, D.W., 1996. Evidence on the relation between corporate governance characteristics and the quality 
of financial reporting (No. 9601). University of Michigan. 
Wright, D.W., 1996. Evidence on the relation between corporate governance characteristics and the quality 
of ﬁnancial reporting. Working paper (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI). 
Yermack, D., 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of 
financial economics, 40(2): 185-211. 
 
 
